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SENSITIVITY OF CAUTIOUS-RELAXED INVESTMENT POLICIES
TO TARGET VARIATION
JARRED FOSTER AND JACEK B. KRAWCZYK
Abstract. This study builds on recent findings that target-based utility measures, used
in the dynamic portfolio optimisation, deliver investment policies that can generate left-
skewed payoff distributions. These policies can lead to small probabilities of low payoffs.
This is in contrast to the classical portfolio optimisation strategies that commonly de-
liver right-skewed payoff distributions, which imply a high probability of losses. The
left-skewed payoff distributions can be obtained when a “cautious-relaxed” investment
policy is applied in portfolio management. Such a policy will be adopted by investors
who are both cautious in seeking a payoff meeting a certain target, but relaxed toward
the possibility of exceeding it. We use computational methods to analyse the effects of
varying the target on the payoff distribution and also examine how the fund manager’s
explicit preferences, when they differ from the investor’s, can impact the distribution.
We found that increasing the target causes the distribution to become less left skewed.
Lowering the target slightly, keeps the left-skewed payoff distribution albeit the mode
diminishes. Decreasing the target substantially so it is below the safe investment payoff,
changes the skew. Investor’s payoff will not suffer even if the actual fund manager allows
for their own utility in the optimisation problem.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Krawczyk (2008) uses a target-seeking performance measure with differ-
ent slopes on each side of the target, to replace the “classical” risk-averse utility function
usually utilised for dynamic portfolio management in papers such as Merton (1971). The
target-seeking problems solved in Krawczyk (2008) and in this paper1 concern a pension
fund investor deciding how to allocate funds between a secure and a risky asset. By opti-
mising a target-seeking performance measure, new ‘cautious-relaxed’ policies are obtained
that can generate left-skewed payoff distributions, as opposed to the right-skewed ones
that result from maximisation of an expected concave utility function. The aim of this
paper is to see how the dynamics of this problem changes when the size of the target is
varied and also when the investment strategy is implemented by a “manager” whose goals
might differ from those of the investor’s (“client”).
Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance, PO Box 600, Wellington 6140,
NZ. fosterjarr@myvuw.ac.nz & J.Krawczyk@vuw.ac.nz.
1This paper draws from and extends Foster (2011).
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In our view, an analysis of cautious-relaxed policies and of the resulting left-skewed payoff
distributions constitutes a step toward a better understanding of certain investors’ be-
haviour. We contend that some investors (eg, pension optimisers) are not uniformly risk-
averse but, asymmetrically, adamant to avoid low payoff realisations, yet not zealously
seeking to maximise them. Utility measures that are unsymmetrical and target seeking
are also seen in prospect theory, in papers such as Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Berke-
laar et al. (2004) and Jin and Zhou (2008), where a target seeking agent has a kinked
function. However, in contrast to the prospect-theory utility measures that are convex
before and concave after the kink, the utility measures considered here are locally concave
ie, concave before and after the kink. Also, generically, under prospect theory, the in-
vestor is less concerned about big losses, than one with a cautious-relaxed utility measure
(see Azzato et al. (2011)). This adversity to big losses means that our investor would be
more accepting of small losses ie, slightly less than the target, than one following prospect
theory.
Our underlying non-symmetrical (with respect to risk) cautious-relaxed utility measures,
which can capture agent’s target-seeking behaviour, are non-differentiable and only locally
concave. This prevents us from seeking closed-form optimal solutions. Our solutions will
then be numerical and, hence, parameter specific. The hypothetical base-case scenario,
which we will study, involves an initial outlay invested in a pension fund to grow and be
collected as a lump sum after a given optimisation horizon. The investor has the choice
between two assets, one being risk-free and the other a “volatile” risky asset with an
expected return higher than the risk-free asset’s. All financial parameters like the secure
asset interest rate, risky-asset drift, volatility, etc. are assumed known and the allocation
policy is a maximiser of a given utility measure. Notwithstanding the solution parameter-
specificity, our analysis can be extended to other cases through the use of specialised
software (see Azzato and Krawczyk (2008b).)
The decision of how to allocate a portfolio in a dynamic setup is one that has been solved
on countless occasions with the most prominent paper being Merton (1971) where Merton
built a continuous-time version of a model proposed in Samuelson (1969). These were the
first pioneering papers in terms of dynamic portfolio management. This is different to
papers such as Markowitz (1952), which deal with a static version of the problem as
opposed to a dynamic one. All these papers focused on utility functions that are HARA2,
as opposed to the above mentioned prospect-theory convex-concave utility measures or
target-seeking, seen here3. The exception being He and Zhou (2011a) who deal, in a static
setting, with the problem of a loss averse-agent and introduce a loss aversion measure
called the large-loss aversion degree (LLAD).
In Pliska (1986) an optimal portfolio is chosen by modeling security prices as semi-
martingales. In Boda et al. (2004) Markov decision processes are used to maximise the
probability that wealth exceeds a certain target. In Cairns (2000) a contribution rate is
incorporated into the problem, meaning rather than allocating a set amount paid at the
2Hyperbolic absolute risk aversion.
3Also see Krawczyk (2001), Krawczyk (2005), Azzato et al. (2011), Krawczyk (2008).
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beginning of the investment period, the agent continuously contributes to the fund. This
is an idea that in the future could be incorporated into the setup used in this paper. There
have been countless other models and methods used at solving such dynamic problems.
These include using VaR and CVaR as constraints as in Yiu (2004) and Bogentoft et al.
(2001), but the strategies found in these models still generate right skewed distributions,
which are deemed not preferable by pension fund optimisers.
The problem of how a portfolio is allocated when using a utility function like those seen in
prospect theory was solved in Jin and Zhou (2008). These authors solved the problem by
splitting it into subproblems and found that the optimal strategy is one in which the in-
vestor takes on aggressive gambling policies. This can also be seen in Azzato et al. (2011)
where a prospect theory utility function generates a more aggressive investment strategy
for any level of wealth than a comparable strategy of “our” cautious-relaxed investor.4
An impact of the investment horizon on the investment strategies of a prospect-theoretic
investor is studied in Dierkes et al. (2010); they show, using a probability weighting func-
tion, that the attractiveness of more secure investments increases as the horizon shortens.
5 However, up until this paper, the research has focussed solely on one target for the
kinked utility functions’ investors, with none being performed on the effect of increasing
or decreasing it.
Another aspect of this paper (and others involving the cautious-relaxed investor), which
differentiates it from other research in this area, is the approach we use to compare and
rank utility functions. The traditional method to decide on a utility function is based on
psychological experiments and perceived preferences of individuals. This is then used to
derive a functional form for the utility function and a portfolio optimisation problem is
solved based on this measure and the obtained strategy is optimal. However, there seems
to be little attention given to the actual outcomes that eventuate from the investment
strategy, deemed optimal for the adopted utility function. One exception to this is the
work done on the distribution builder in Goldstein et al. (2008), in which experiments are
performed where subjects are allowed to build their desired pension distribution subject
to a budget constraint. The results lead to distributions that are right skewed, but this
could be due to the setting of a reference point at the amount guaranteed by the risk-free
asset. In He and Zhou (2011b) quantiles are proposed as an effective way to evaluate
the success and failings of a portfolio. Indeed, we contend that a better way to compare
utility functions is to look at the distributions of outcomes that arise form following each
optimal strategy. This way, a better idea can be gained for the level of success that is
derived from the investment strategy that is produced from the utility function. Only
then can one come to a conclusion about the appropriateness of each measure and its
level of realism when compared with the actual strategies used by investors.
4A comparison of the outcomes of both investment strategies: prospect-theoretic and cautious-relaxed
can be found in Azzato et al. (2011) where, for the assumed parameters, the distributions obtained by
the prospect theoretic investor appear similar to the Merton investor’s. This idea is implied by the fact
that they are both right skewed with a high probability of loss.
5Somehow similarly, the cautious-relaxed policies, which depend on the time remaining until the end
of the horizon, advocate more secure investments once the target has been reached.
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In our model, the current fund value is diminished by a management fee, as if a manager
charged for their services. This may mean that if the fund was actually controlled by
a “manager” and not by the “client”, the “manager” may want to modify the cautious-
relaxed policy, to suit their utility. In the later part of the paper, we propose a model
modification that incorporates the manager’s preferences. In that part of the paper, the
portfolio will be allocated according to a strategy that maximises a weighted average of
both the manager’s and the client’s utility measures. We note that this introduces a
principal-agent dynamics to the problem. It is found that the effect this has on fund
distributions is not overly significant and in some cases may even cause some investor’s
payoff improvements.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduce the setup for the problem and the
methods used to solve it. In Section 3 we present an optimal solution to the Merton-
investor problem and show the resulting utility function distribution; a cautious-relaxed
investor problem is formulated and solved in Section 4. In Section 5 the effect of varying of
the investor’s target is analysed and the fund distributions are compared. Section 6 deals
with the manager’s incentives and assesses the resulting distributions when the manager
considers their own payoff. Section 7 finishes with some concluding remarks.
2. Setting up the Problem
2.1. The model. Consider an investor with savings of x0 that will not be required for a
period of T years (for example they may be retiring in T years). The investor wants to
collect a payoff from x0, after the T year period, from a pension fund. The investment
strategy is chosen in order to maximise a certain objective function that could be decided
on by the investor.
The investor’s portfolio consists of two assets one being risky and the other risk-free,
as is commonly seen in the literature. It is assumed that there are no transaction fees,
meaning that rebalancing the portfolio has zero cost. However, later, we will allow for a
management fee that the fund administrator may charge.
The price of the risky asset pptq follows a geometric Brownian motion as follows:
(1) dpptq  apptqdt  spptqdw
where dw is a standard Brownian motion. The a term is a constant and represents the
drift of the asset, higher levels of this represent higher expected returns for the asset. The
s term is also a constant and represents the volatility of the asset. The risk-free asset’s
price qptq follows the process:
(2) dqptq  rqptqdt
where r   a and r, a, s ¡ 0. At any point in time uptq is the proportion of wealth invested
in the risky asset hence wealth xptq follows the process:
(3) dxptq  p1 uptqqrxptqdt  uptqxptqpadt  sdwq Uptqdt
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where Uptq is the agent’s consumption rate.
The investor needs to choose a strategy such that it maximises discounted expected utility.
This could mean that (4) is maximised:
(4) Jpx0, uq  E
Z T
0
ertgpUptqqdt | xp0q  x0

where gpUptqq is the investor’s instantaneous utility function, r ¡ 0 is the discount rate
and E is a mathematical expectation. Now, (4) can be augmented without any loss of
generality to become:
(5) Jpx0, uq  E
Z T
0
ertgpUptqqdt  erTspxpTqq | xp0q  x0

where spxpTqq is the final payoff function.
For this study, Uptq  0 meaning that the agent will make no withdrawals from the fund
until time T.6 Consequently, the pension fund investor’s objective function becomes:
(6) Jpx0, uq  ErerTspxpTqq | xp0q  x0s .
Note that as erT is a constant it can be omitted without affecting the result.
Now, we will also assume that a fee exptq, e ¡ 0 is to be charged at a continuous rate
as if a “manager” was charging for their services. The inclusion of this fee changes the
dynamics of the problem slightly, in that (3) is now altered to become
(7) dxptq  p1 uptqqpr eqxptqdt  uptqxptqppa eqdt  sdwq.
So, the efficient bond rate is r e and the risky asset drift a e.
Therefore a pension fund investor needs to maximise (6) subject to (7) and also xptq ¥ 0
and 0 ¤ uptq ¤ 1. 7
2.2. Parameters. As stated in the introduction, our solutions will be numerical and,
hence, parameter specific. The hypothetical base-case scenario, which we study, involves
an initial outlay x0  $40 000 invested in a pension fund to grow and be collected as a
lump sum after a given optimisation horizon of T  10 years. Table 1 shows the rest of
the parameters8 that are to be utilised for this study.
r a s e
0.05 0.085 0.2 .005
Table 1. Chosen parameters
6Uptq can also be made positive without any effect on the Merton investor’s strategy, considered in
Section 3.
7This means we forbid the act of short selling.
8This paper is similar to Azzato et al. (2011) in its choice of parameters.
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With these parameters the fund will accumulate to 40 000ep0.05.005q10  62 732.49 if all
money is invested in the risk-free asset. From this point on, this figure will be referred
to as the guaranteed amount. It should be expected that a pension fund investor would
require the pension yield to regularly surpass this value.
2.3. SOCSol. Due to the non-symmetric and non smooth nature of the cautious-relaxed
investor’s utility function, an analytical solution to the investment problem is not avail-
able. We get around this by generating the optimal investment strategies using a program
called SOCSol, developed in Matlab and introduced in Azzato and Krawczyk (2008a).
The program discretises optimal control problems and solves them using Markov Chains,
meaning the usual requirement of a differentiable objective function can be ignored. See
Azzato and Krawczyk (2008a), Windsor and Krawczyk (1997) and Azzato and Krawczyk
(2008b) for more details on SOCSol.
Different possibilities for the movement of the risky asset are generated within SOCSol
using Monte Carlo simulation. Given each optimal investment strategy, this can be used
to produce the distributions of wealth at time T. The histograms shown later are the
distributions of fund value given by 5000 simulations.
On the other hand, the classical, concave utility-function optimisation is amenable to a
closed form solution and will be presented below.
3. The Merton investor
3.1. The classical utiltiy measure. An expected-payoff utility function is the classical
portfolio performance measure, see Merton (1971) and Samuelson (1969). In this section,
we assume that a pension-fund investor uses this function. We will present the (known)
optimal investment strategy and analyse the resulting payoff distribution.
The choice of spxpTqq in (6) is now the issue of concern. The classical Merton investor
will use the concave utility function as follows (compare Fleming and Rishel (1975)):
(8) spxpTqq  1
d
[xpTq]d , 0   d   1.
Analytically, the optimal solution to this problem can easily be found as a solution to
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. First, we define a value function for the portfolio
problem:
(9) Vpt, xq  supu Jpxptq, uq.
This gives the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
(10) max

1
2
uptq2s2x2Vxxpt, xq   pr  uptqpa rq  eqxptqVxpt, xq  Vtpt, xq

 0
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with boundary condition
(11) VpT, xq  1
d
[xpTq]d .
Maximisation of (10) gives
(12) uptq  a r
s2
Vxpt, xq
xVxxpt, xq
substituting into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (10) implies
(13) 0  1
2
pa rq2
s2
V2x pt, xq
Vxxpt, xq   pr eqxptqVxpt, xq  Vtpt, xq.
The boundary condition set by (11) suggests the functional form:
(14) Vpt, xq  f ptq1
d
xd, f pTq  0 ;
plugging this into (13) we are left with an ordinary differential equation:
(15) 0 

1
2
pa rq2
s2pd 1q   pr eq

f ptq   f 1ptq.
This ODE is easily solved with a solution f ptq  1 implying that Vpt, xq  1dxd, substi-
tuting into (12) gives
(16) uptq  pa rq
s2p1 dq ,
which is the known optimal solution to the Merton investor’s problem (eg, see Fleming
and Rishel (1975)).
So, we see that the management fee has no impact on the optimal strategy and, more
importantly for our study, this strategy, for the dynamic-portfolio investor, is practically
static. Ie, it does not change with time and wealth. The same proportion of wealth is
always invested into the risky and risk-free asset. This seems to be quite unintuitive
in that you would expect an investor to change their strategy in order to adjust to the
performance of the portfolio. For the remainder of this paper the investor using (16) will
be referred to as the Merton investor.
3.2. The distributions. The main argument of this paper (and also that of the other
publications on cautious-relaxed policies) is that the Merton investor’s strategy frequently
delivers payoffs that are low, often beneath the initial outlay. If so, while a lotto-player
will be happy to employ it, a pension fund investor will not.
Let us now then calculate the payoff xpTq distribution for the Merton investor and examine
its distribution to justify the above claim. We find9 that after fitting the optimal control
9Refer to the methods put forward in Kloeden and Platen (1992) and Annunziato and Borzì (2010).
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(17) to the state equation (7), wealth xptq is a Geometric Brownian Motion that follows
(17) dxptq  Mxptqdt  S xptqdw
where M  pr aq
2
p1 dqs2   r e and S 
a r
s p1 dq . This means that for an initial value x0,
wealth xptq t P p0, Ts is a log-normally distributed random variable with expected value
Mptq  Epxptqq  eMtx0
and variance
S2ptq  Varpxptqq  e2Mtx20

eS
2t  1

.
We also know that the wealth is the stochastic process
(18) xptq  x0 exp

M S
2
2

t  Swptq

, t P r0 Ts .
Finally, the probability density function of wealth xpTq is log-normal:
(19) fXTpx;MT,STq 
1
xST
p
2pT
exp
 
pln x ln x0  TpMT 
1
2S
2
Tqq2
2S2TT
!
, x ¡ 0
where MT, ST are Mptq, Sptq evaluated at t  T.
We know that a log-normal distribution is generically non-symmetric and, in our view,
this causes a problem of using policy (16) by an investor seeking to avoid large losses.
Plugging in the values given in Table 1 to the Merton solution given in (16) and using a
d of 0.05 gives an optimal uptq of 0.921. This means that 92.1% of wealth at any time
is invested in the risky asset. Now that all the respective parameters have been set,
we can evaluate values for the mean and variance using the formulae given above These
parameters yield a mean of 86 595.5 and a standard deviation of 55 041.91. These values
suggest frequent payoffs below the initial outlay of $40 000, even before we have analysed
their actual distribution.
This investment strategy provides the distribution of payoffs shown in Figure 1. The
blue line represents the integral of the theoretical PDF derived in (19), where the limits
correspond to each bin in the histogram.10 We see that the payoff is right skewed with
a relatively high probability of either being below the original investment or below the
guaranteed amount.
On the other hand, Figure 1 shows that the right-hand tail of the distribution extends to
$150 000 and beyond and there is a good probability of having a high level of wealth, at the
end of the 10 years. However, the probability of wealth being less than the guaranteed
10The background histogram shows the distribution of the Merton-investor’s fund yields obtained
through Monte Carlo simulation in SOCSol, which we produced using the same method as for the cautious-
relaxed policy payoffs discussed later in the paper.The agreement between the theoretical distribution
and that produced by SOCSol provides encouraging evidence of the accuracy of our method of generating
the payoff distributions.
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Figure 1. Payoff distribution for Merton’s investor
amount is about 40%, hence making a loss appears worryingly frequent. Many agents
saving for their pension would find this to be an unsatisfactory result.
4. The Cautious-Relaxed Investor
4.1. A new measure. This section will present an alternative, cautious-relaxed utility
measure. Here, the investor sets a target level for the wealth at the end of the time period.
If the wealth is below the target, the portfolio performance is quantified as profoundly
negative (punishable) and any yield above it is moderately positive (rewarded). This is
given using the following function:
(20) spxpTqq 
 pxpTq  xTqk if xpTq ¥ xT,
pxT  xpTqqa otherwise 0   k   1, a ¡ 1.
Here xT is a target set prior to the investment period, and the values of k and a are set
according to the level of reward or punishment for over- or underperformance, respectively.
Note that the measure is concave both above and below the target (with a kink at the
target). This is different to the prospect theoretic utility measures commented on in
Section 1, in that they are convex below the target. A sensible target, xT is selected so
that the following inequalities are satisfied:
(21) 0 ¤ x0   x0epreqT   xT
where e is the management fee. We will see in Section 5 that xT may also be treated as a
computational device, which can modulate the wealth distribution skewness. Currently,
the inequalities are set as a matter of common sense as it seems unrealistic that an
investor would set himself a target that is below the guaranteed level of wealth. The
effect of relaxing these inequalities will be investigated later in this paper.
We notice that the target-seeking utility function in use here is punishing of any fund
value below a set target and rewarding any amount above this target; however, the level
of punishment for under-performance is greater than the utility gained by surpassing the
target. This means that, with certain parameters, if the target is within reach all wealth
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will be allocated to the risk-free asset. Otherwise, depending on the current fund position
relative to the target, more or less is invested in the risky asset.
4.2. Strategy and Distribution. Now, we will call the investor that follows a pol-
icy that maximises (6) with (20) the cautious-relaxed investor (CR). The target, xT, is
originally set to $100 000 because if the volatility from the risky asset is eliminated and
only the drift remained then $40 000 would become ep0.0850.005q10  89 021.63, which is
“rounded up” to 100 000 to ensure it is not too easily obtainable. Finally, k is set to 0.88
and a is is chosen to equal 1.5.
Investment strategies are generated by SOCSol on the discretised time and wealth grid.
Figure 2 shows these strategies11 for an investor maximising a cautious-relaxed utility
measure with the parameters given above. The vertical axis is uptq, the proportion to be
invested into the risky asset and the horizontal axis is the level of wealth xptq. For the
sake of brevity we plot only two lines representing the investment strategies at time 0 and
time 6.
Figure 2. Control rule for target of 100 000
It is important to note that some levels of wealth, which we denote xSptq, will virtually
generate no investment in the risky asset. This will happen when the target xT can be
obtained without the risky asset and if the risky-asset investment brings an expected
value that is less than the secure investment. For example if at time 6, xp6q  83 527,
then uptq  0 for t P r6, Ts. This is because 83 527ep0.050.005qp106q = 100 000 so, xT is
obtainable without the risky asset. For the relatively high volatility (s  0.2), the risky-
asset investment of the size compatible with the adopted grid size, brings an expected
value of marginal utility that is less than the secure gain and all funds12 will be allocated
to the risk-free asset. We can say that wealth at time 6 has reached the secure-investment
level xSp6q. Using uptq  0 for t ¥ 6 from xSp6q causes every xptq to the right of
the x-intercept of the strategy graph in Figure 2, to be reached at the “right” time for
11These are obtained in SOCSol using $50 as the discretisation step of wealth and a time step of 0.01
of a year. The upper bound for wealth is set at 1 000 000.
12We can see in Krawczyk (2008) that uptq is never zero for less volatile risky assets.
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the investor to continue the strategy upxSptqq  0. Investment strategies above each
level xSptq illustrate the investor’s decisions if somehow, eg, because of a favourable noise
realisation, the fund value were to be over this level.
The strategies that solve a portfolio-investment problem of the cautious-relaxed investor,
shown in Figure 2 are dynamic: they change with time and wealth. This is different to
the static strategy (16) obtained for the Merton investor.
More in detail, we notice that the investment minimum, which occurs at u  0, defines
two investment zones. (1) Fund values xptq P p0, xSptqq, from which the target can only
be reached by investing in the risky asset. Here, the investor must gamble to evade heavy
penalties for falling short of the target. (2) Fund values xptq ¡ xSptq, from which the
target can be reached by investing solely in the secure asset. In this zone, the investor
maximises their reward for exceeding the target.
Despite this not being the norm in the literature, it seems intuitive that an investor would
adjust their allocations with performance. For example, if an investor’s fund is performing
poorly, one would expect that the investor would be well advised to shift their investment
towards more risky investments in order to at least have the chance of recouping losses.13
Figure 3. Payoff distribution for target of 100 000
Figure 3 shows the payoff distribution for an investor using a cautious-relaxed utility
function with a target of $100 000. We propose that this distribution should be considered
favourable to the Merton investor’s in that it is left skewed and the probability of loss
seems to be much lower, which many investors would prefer.
This preference for left, or negative14, skewness is related to the third derivative of the
cautious-relaxed investor’s utility function, which is negative when a  1.5. A negative
13We abstract from the situations, in which the risky asset started performing poorly because the drift
a decreased or s changed.
14Many authors say that:  when the left tail is longer and the mass of the distribution is concentrated
on the right of the figure, the distributions is said negatively skewed;  when the right tail is longer and
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third derivative implies a dislike towards the third moment of a distribution ie, skewness
or, in other words, preference for negative (or left). This goes against the norm in the
literature, in which it is often suggested that an investor prefers positive skewness. Bali
et al. (2011) and Barberis and Huang (2008) find that cumulative prospect theory can
explain investor’s desire for positive skewness, which can lead to right skewed securities
being over-priced. This is because these investors are drawn to the lottery-like character-
istic of these securities in that in odd cases they can provide extremely high returns. We
propose that pension savers do not belong to this class of investors.
Chiu (2010) observes that gamblers appear to be skewness lovers, whereas we consider a
pension-fund investor to be the opposite or an “antigambler”. We believe that the high
probability of loss, which can be associated with positively skewed distributions, would be
unacceptable to such an investor even with the chance of big gains. Therefore we propose
that a pension fund optimiser should have a preference towards negative skewness. This
idea is supported by findings in Brockett and Kahane (1992), in which it is found that
there are cases where a risk averse investor prefers negative skewness. This is not the
case with both the Merton utility function and the function from prospect theory where
the utility measures have positive third derivatives. This implies that the utility measure
shown in (20) better captures the preferences of such a pension-fund investor towards
negative skewness. We observe a clearly negative – ie, left – skewness in Figure 3, which
as said above shows the pension-fund payoff distribution with target 100 000. We read
from the histogram that the probability of a fund value below the guaranteed amount is
approximately 25% for the cautious-relaxed strategy, 15% less than the Merton investor.
4.3. Comparison of Distributions. Table 2 (in Section 5.2) shows various distribution
characteristics for these two investors under the “Merton” and “100,000” columns. (The
other columns will be commented on in Section 5 when the savings target is varied.)
The Merton distribution scores better than the cautious-relaxed, only with regard to the
mean. The Merton distribution predicts higher probabilities of low payoffs (eg, 15% of
receiving less than $40 000 as opposed to 10% given by the cautious-relaxed policy), and a
lower probability of scoring more that $75 000. That feature may be crucial for a pension-
fund investor to prefer the cautious-relaxed policy over Merton’s, even though Merton’s
strategy has the potential to provide really high payoffs.
These results imply that the Merton investor’s mean could be driven by very high outliers,
which counteract a high probability of loss. In general, characteristics such as the median,
the standard deviation and the probability of loss are also important to consider. These
statistics will give a better idea of what is causing the mean to be at the level that it
is. This is where the cautious-relaxed investor’s policies in Krawczyk (2008) show some
favourable (for pension optimisers) characteristics as the median is higher, the standard
deviation lower and probability of loss is smaller.
the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the left of the figure the distributions is said positively
skewed.
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The Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) will also be taken into
account as measures of success for each distribution. bVaR for a given probability level b
is defined to be the lowest level of loss such that the probability of making a larger loss
is b. In our scenario, loss will be defined as any pension value below the initial outlay.
bCVaR is the the mean level of loss above the bVaR. See Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000)
or Bogentoft et al. (2001), also Krawczyk (2008), for more information on these measures.
After looking at the characteristics for each distribution, a discussion of a pension fund
investor’s motivations can take place with the goal of analysing the effects of varying the
target.
Notwithstanding the informativeness of the above parametric measures, it is the under-
lying payoff distribution, which caries full information relevant to the investor, which we
propose to utilise to determine the utility function which is “right” for a pension saver.
5. Varying the target
5.1. Strategies. The question to be asked now is what is the best target for the cautious-
relaxed investor to set, in order to get the most preferable payoff distribution? We suggest
that they would be willing to accept a lower mean payoff for the sake of a lower variance
and negative skewness, similar to that shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 4 the investment strategies for investors setting targets of $80 000, $120 000,
$140 000 and $160 000 are shown respectively. These appear to be similar to those shown
in Figure 2 but are shifted left for lower and right for higher targets. This is due to
the differing levels of aggression required in order to reach more ambitious targets. This
means that at any time and wealth level a higher value of uptq is required to reach the
higher targets. Varying the target does not only shift the investor’s strategy, the slope of
the rules becomes flatter with higher targets and steepens with lower targets. This means
that an increase in wealth has a more significant impact on the investment strategy for a
lower target than one that is greater.
5.2. Distributions. Again, using Monte-Carlo simulation, the distribution of payoffs
generated by the strategies shown in Figure 4 are produced, giving the histograms shown
in Figure 5. The various parametric measures of “success” for the different utility savings’
targets are shown in Table 2. The best value under each criteria is shown in bold font.
This table communicates some interesting results. Firstly, the mean always increases with
the target but at a decreasing rate. The mean for a target of $160 000 is $83 310 which
is relatively close to the mean of the Merton investor $86 308. The median is highest
for a target of $120 000 and it begins to decrease after this; noticeably, all of the targets
have higher medians than the Merton investor, which indicates left skewness. The 40th
percentile15 peaks with the $100 000 investor and begins to drop as the target gets higher.
The standard deviation of payoffs increases with the target implying that the higher the
15The 40th percentile is the value at which 40% of fund values fall below.
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Figure 4. Portfolio management strategies for times 0 and 6.
Target Merton 80 000 100 000 120 000 140 000 160 000
Mean of xp10q 86308 69 434 75 228 78 777 82 081 83 310
Median of xp10q 73 207 73 618 83 343 87306 82 389 77 190
40-th percentile of xp10q 63 092 71 700 78119 74 131 68 088 64 065
Std. dev. of xp10q 53 737 11231 21 331 29 408 35 517 40 539
Coeff. of skew. of xp10q 1.8789 -2.1697 -1.0518 -0.4942 -0.1180 0.1696
5% VaR 11 304.78 -25 25.47 97 60.09 13 121.55 13 806.04 14 248.73
5% CVaR 17 074.97 8768.84 16 146.53 18 819.93 19 205.84 19 851.18
10% VaR 5 101.34 -15 305.95 -328.77 6 067.88 6 062.49 8 302.43
10% CVaR 12 531.69 -3 040.65 10 496.73 10 742.56 14 462.86 15 538.68
Ppxp10q ¡ .95xTq N.A. 0.3072 0.1240 0.0572 0.0296 0.0186
Ppxp10q ¡ $75 000q 0.4848 0.3968 0.6436 0.595 0.5460 0.5182
Ppxp10q   $62, 732q 0.3964 0.1742 0.2482 0.3242 0.3556 0.3876
Ppxp10q   $40 000q 0.1494 0.0414 0.0984 0.1456 0.1530 0.1706
Ppxp10q   $20 000q 0.0116 0.0034 0.0108 0.0164 0.0170 0.0194
Table 2. Final fund return distribution statistics. Highest ranked statis-
tics are in bold font.
goal the more volatile the distribution. This is very much an expected result because
the higher the target the higher the proportion allocated to the more volatile risky asset.
However, the highest standard deviation of $40 539 pales in comparison to the standard
deviation of $53,737 belonging to the Merton investor.
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Figure 5. Portfolio payoff distributions at time 10
The skewness coefficient16 is highly negative for lower targets, and increases with higher
targets, eventually becoming positive for a target of $160 000. This means the property of
left skewness, claimed favourable, begins to diminish with higher targets and eventually
the distribution becomes right skewed, similar to the Merton investor’s. The Value at
Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)17 for both a 5% and 10% confidence
level at first tend to increase significantly with the target but then appear to plateau for
targets above $120 000. It is interesting to see that both the VaR and CVaR for targets
above $100 000 are higher than that of the Merton investor, and that the 10% VaR for the
$140 000 target is lower that the $120 000 target. In fact, it seems as if VaR and CVaR
are indicators, for which the cautious-relaxed policies generate loss-prone distributions,
especially with higher targets. This could be due to the fact that when these levels of loss
are being made, the investor shifts all funds to the risky asset, which causes more money
to be put at risk.
16The skewness coefficient is calculated as E

pXmq
s
3

where m is the mean and s is standard deviation.
It provides a measure of asymmetry in the distribution.
17
bVaR for a given probability level b is defined to be the lowest level of loss such that the probability
of making a larger loss is b. bCVaR is the the mean level of loss above the bVaR. In this scenario, loss is
defined as any pension value below the initial outlay.
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As the target becomes more difficult to obtain the probability of being within 5% of
it decreases. An interesting characteristic to note is that the Merton investor has a
higher probability of having a fund value below $62 732 but he has a better probability
of providing a fund value of above $40 000 than both the $140 000 and $160 000 targeting
investors. This could again be due to the fact that the target seeking investors, upon
reaching the point where they are near $40 000 are so far away from their target that they
allocate all funds to the risky asset, which can be detrimental to their fund value.
As predicted, in many ways the investor targeting $160 000 is very similar to the Merton
investor in the characteristics of their distributions. The preferable properties of the
investor with a $100 000 target’s distribution begin to get lost with these higher targets
and the differences between them and the Merton investor begin to blur. However, it is
important to consider the fact that the target-seeking investors statistics are affected a
lot less by outliers. A risky asset, which is performing strong, can cause the value of the
Merton fund to tend towards extremely high values causing big increases in the mean.
This is not the case with the target seeking investors as once these funds are within their
target, the investor will choose not to let them increase in value to the same extent.
5.3. Which to Choose? Looking at Table 2, $80 000 has the highest number of criteria
in bold font. This is mainly due to the fact that the target is relatively unambitious, and
when it comes to probability of loss this target performs very well. However, in terms of
mean and median this target performs the least favourably. This could potentially lead
one to select $100 000 as a target, where the 40th percentile and the probability of being
greater than $75,000 are in bold. This has come at the cost of slightly higher probabilities
of loss, but with a higher mean and median than the $80 000 target. Further increases in
the targets cause gradual worsening in these statistics, therefore $100 000 seems to be the
most suitable target.
Figure 6 shows the PDFs and CDFs of the different investors. These are generated using
the Parzen-Rosenblatt window method, which is a convenient way of smoothing the data
and is often considered an improvement on the jaggedness of the histograms shown in
Figures 5 and 3.
As the target increases the PDFs begin to flatten out. An interesting feature in the PDFs
is the significant drop in the peak from the 80 000 target line to the 100 000 line, showing
how much more likely achieving a target close to 80 000 is than the other targets. The
CDFs act as would be expected, also becoming less and less steep as the target increases.
It is clear, simply from looking at the CDFs that no distribution dominates the others in
terms of first-order or second-order stochastic dominance.18
18It is shown in Krawczyk (2008) that there is no first or second-order stochastic dominance between
the Merton investor’s distribution and cautious-relaxed.
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Figure 6. PDFs and CDFs for final distributions.
5.4. A Lower Target. We will now show that it is possible to devise portfolio manage-
ment strategies, which generate positively (ie, right) skewed strategies with zero proba-
bility of loss.19
Consider loosening the inequalities set in (21) to check the effect of setting the target
below the guaranteed amount xSp0q. This would imply that the investor starts investing
to the right of the x-intercept at the beginning of the investment period. This is because
the target is guaranteed at this point, meaning that some of the wealth can be risked by
investing in the risky asset. If the risky asset performs poorly, wealth is allocated back
towards the risk-free asset. However, if the risky asset performs well a larger proportion
of funds are allocated to it. This means that the client is effectively setting a minimum
amount that they will allow the value of their investment to fall to. For this example
the target will be set to $60 000 and $50 000 which is below the guaranteed amount of
$62 732. The investment strategies and fund distributions are shown in Figure 7.
This gives right skewed distributions, but unlike Merton’s model the probability of being
below the original outlay of $40 000 is zero. The shift in attitude towards skewness is
due to the fund predominantly being above the target meaning the third derivative of
the cautious-relaxed utility measure is positive implying a preference towards skewness.
Some pension fund investors could be drawn to this distribution, because of the fact there
is a probability of some higher payoffs without the risk of significant loss shown in the
other distributions. Note that this changes the dynamics of the investor’s behaviour from
19Remember, the Merton investor’s strategies are right skewed with a high probability of loss.
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Figure 7. Histogram and control rules for targets of 50 000 and 60 000
one that is ‘loss avoiding’ to one in which they are setting a minimum value for the fund
to fall to. The performance of this investor is still not competitive with the others in
that the moment the portfolio begins to perform poorly all wealth is allocated to the
risk-free asset and kept there for the remainder of the investment period. This is shown
in the histograms by high frequencies of values at or close to the target. Like the Merton
investor the performance of this fund is driven by outliers, which can provide misleading
statistics.
6. The Manager’s Incentives
In the previous sections it is assumed that the manager will be willing to follow the choices
of the loss avoiding client, with no concern for the effect that this could have on their own
payoff. It is possible that the manager will not be satisfied with the customer’s decision
and be tempted to deviate from it.
6.1. Introducing the Manager’s Utility. In preceding sections the expected value
of the final payoff function has been maximised without consideration of the manager’s
motivations. The effect of the manager deciding to shy away from the preferences of
the customer towards their own payoffs is to be tested. This will be completed with
the intention of testing the consequences that this may have on the investment strategy
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and distribution of the fund. It will be assumed that the manager will now maximise a
weighted average of their own and the customer’s utility function. This would mean that
the following equation would be maximised instead of (6):
(22) Jpx0, uq  E

p1 nq
Z T
0
ert f pxmptqqdt  nertspxpTqq|xp0q  x0

where n is the amount of weight the manager places on the customer’s preferences and
f pxmptqq is the manager’s instantaneous utility function with regards to the manager’s
revenue xmptq. This implies that the closer n is to 0 the more the manager is thinking
about their own payoff in the present.
It will be assumed that the manager is risk neutral so that their instantaneous utility
function is
(23) f pxmptqq  xmptq  exptq  0.005xptq.
This choice is made because the management fee is relatively low in comparison with the
actual fund value. This means that modelling the manager as risk averse would cause
their utility function to be even more dwarfed by the measure of the customer. The choice
of f pq implies that the manager’s preferences are the opposite of the highly risk averse
client’s. The higher n is, the lower the level of self-control the manager has and the more
likely they are to invest in a way that differs to the interests of the client. Note that the
discounting term has been added back into the customers utility measure in (22) because
now the manager’s utility is being discounted, so too must the customer’s in order to be
consistent. The problem to be solved now is to maximise (22) subject to (7) and other
constraints mentioned in Section 2.1. The target is to be fixed at $100 000.
The two extreme cases: of n  0, when maximised is the expected value of the integral
of the manager’s utility function and of n  0, when utility of the final clients’s payoff is
maximised, are different optimal control problems. However, one and the other concern
xptq, t P r0, 10s and, in broad terms, if one problem’s performance index is high, so is
the other’s. For example, the manager will accomplish a great payoff only if process xptq
realisations have been high; this forecasts a large final payoff to the client, if there was
no substantial crash at the end of the horizon. On the other hand, if the clients payoff
is large, then the xptq values for t   T must have been high, unless there was a strong
positive shock of wealth close to T. So, even if the two problems are dissimilar, a mixed
criterion like (22) should not produce dramatically different investment strategies than
the cautious-relaxed ones.
Furthermore, actions of the risk neutral manager may compensate the client’s reluctance
to go for big payoffs. Thus, it is not impossible that the resulting payoff distributions
could be left-skewed with even less mass in the left tail, meaning less possibility of low
payoffs. Below, we show how these predictions compare with “reality” ie, our solutions
obtained from SOCSol by the Monte Carlo simulations.
Values utilised for n start at 0.5 and are decreased from there. The first value for n that
has any visible effect on the investment strategy of the manager is 0.0001. This is so
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Figure 8. Control rules for managers with n  0.0001, 0.00001
because the management fee is very small in comparison with the fund value.20 We note
the manager’s strategy when n is set to 0 is to allocate all money to the risky asset, i.e.
set uptq  1, this is due to the assumption of risk neutrality. The investment strategies
for n  0.0001, 0.00001 are shown in Figure 8.
These control rules show that the manager’s strategies tend away from those shown in
Figure 2 towards these more aggressive ones, the lower the level of n is set. The change to
the strategy at time 0 occurs first, as at this point the manager’s payoff is discounted the
least, and therefore the reward is higher to the manager. Here, in Figure 8, a strategy for
time 9 is included because it better illustrates the changes in strategy over time (which
was unnecessary in Section 4 where the strategy slopes do not change much). The problem
has changed in that the timing of wealth gains is now important to the manager and their
tendency is to be more aggressive at times closer to 0 than at times further away. A good
example of this is that the shape of the strategy at time 9 does not visibly change with
the increase in n. This is in contradiction to what is seen in earlier sections in that the
client’s preference is to be more aggressive in later time periods than earlier ones. Here,
these two are effectively counteracting each other in that while the client wishes to become
more aggressive later in the investment period, the manager’s tendency is to take more
risk in earlier stages of the investment period. Effectively, the utility measure used by
this manager is one that is also target seeking, but where the penalty for failing to reach
the target is not as harsh as the cautious-relaxed one used in this paper and, also, there
is more reward for exceeding the target. It may hence be said that the utility function
(22) reflexes preferences of an agent who is less cautious-relaxed than that introduced in
Section 4.
6.2. A Better Distribution? The next question to ask is what effect do these new
strategies have on the distributions of the fund? Figure 9 shows the histograms of the
20This level of weighting may seem small but it is important to remember that the manager only
receives 0.5% of the actual fund value. Thus the weight on their own payoff will have to be extremely
high for it to be comparable to the client’s.
SENSITIVITY OF CAUTIOUS-RELAXED INVESTMENT POLICIES TO TARGET VARIATION 21
customer’s final payoffs for the two strategies alongside the distribution obtained previ-
ously in Figure 3. The summary statistics for these managers as well as a manager with
n  1 are shown in Table 3.
Figure 9. Wealth distributions for managers with n  0.0001, 0.00001,
found in the top and bottom panel, respectively
The distribution when n is 0.0001 (hereafter the selfish manager’s) appears to be superior
to the distribution with n  1 (hereafter called the unselfish manager’s ie, “pure” cautious-
relaxed). Evidence of this is that the probability of payoff being within the 90 000-100 000
bin is higher without significantly affecting the probabilities in the lower bins. When n
is equal to 0.00001 the histogram has reached values above the target; otherwise it has
the rather familiar high mass in the left tail but with some local maximum about the
initial value x0. The case of a ‘super’-sefish manager ie, when n  0 generates rather flat
distributions, with a right skew.
Table 3 shows21 two of the better average fund values obtained so far. The mean of the
manager with a n  0.00001 (very selfish) is $86,252, which is very similar to that of the
Merton manager but with a higher median and a 5% smaller chance of making a loss.
However, when compared with the unselfish $100 000 targeting manager the standard
deviation is significantly higher as too is the probability of loss. The manager with
n  0.0001 has a mean better than the $100 000 targeting manager but this is counteracted
with a slightly more volatile distribution and a higher chance of loss. The probability of
21Here we observe non-monotonicity of the skewness coefficient in n. Despite this, the histogram for
n  0.00001 still reflects the favourable characteristics of previous negatively (left) skewed distributions.
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n 1 (CR) 0.0001 0.00001 0
Mean of xp10q 75228 75449 86252 88532
Median of xp10q 83343 84860 83183 74044
40-th percentile of xp10q 78119 78458 72003 62475
Std. dev. of xp10q 21331 22322 56190 59330
Coeff. of skew. of xp10q -1.0518 -1.0000 2.7986 2.1023
5% VaR 9760.09 10094.47 14146.19 13853.81
5% CVaR 16146.53 16794.07 19484.15 19583.19
10% VaR -328.77 1559.01 6623.27 7239.17
10% CVaR 10496.73 11213.83 14918.14 15099.21
Ppxp10q ¡ .95xTq 0.1240 0.1722 0.3174 0.345
Ppxp10q ¡ 75000q 0.6436 0.6426 0.5782 0.4904
Ppxp10q   $62, 732q 0.2482 0.2594 0.3450 0.4024
Ppxp10q   $40 000q 0.0984 0.1112 0.1618 0.1690
Ppxp10q   $20 000q 0.0108 0.0118 0.0178 0.0190
Table 3. Summary statistics for fund values where manager places weight-
ing of 1 n on their own payoff. Highest ranked statistics are in bold font.
being within 5% of the target of $100 000 is 5% higher than previously ie, when the investor
was cautiously-relaxed (or, if “this” manager was unselfish and used n  1). Note that
the probability of making over $75,000 has decreased and the probability of making under
the secure amount has increased. This shows, as expected, that a risk neutral manager
who starts to think of their own payoffs over that of their client will cause the mean of
distribution of the fund to to increase at the cost of a higher level of volatility. These
distributions still show some strong characteristics, however, and most likely the customer
will not be able to spot the manager’s deviation unless they are able to see the manager’s
investment strategy. Overall, the payoff distribution for n  0.0001 displays the basic
features of a left-skewed payoff distribution of a cautious-relaxed client, moderated by the
risk neutral manager’s policy.
6.3. Sensitivity Analysis. According to some performance measures and Figure 9 it
seems as if the manager with a n  0.0001 has actually improved the client’s final payoff
distribution by considering their own payoff. The volatility has increased slightly but
the mean and probability of achieving the target have also increased. However, when
considering the probability of making over $75,000 the selfish manager does not perform
as well, but only to a very small extent. This could possibly bring into question the
quality of the utility measure spxpTqq and how to improve it. To investigate this matter
further, in this section a sensitivity analysis will take place. The goal being to vary the
volatility parameter s and testing the effect that this has on the performance of the two
managers.
In order to make a fairer comparison of the two managers, the volatility of the risky asset
will be varied. This will show how each manager fares with both a more and a less volatile
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risky asset. One would expect to see the selfish manager provide a higher probability of
loss with a more volatile asset as the strategy is more aggressive. On the other hand with
a less volatile asset this manager could potentially provide a better payoff distribution.
Figure 10 shows the investment strategies and final payoff distributions when the volatility
of the risky asset s is decreased to 0.05. The strategy of the selfish manager is omitted
because uptq  1 for all values of wealth and time. Also for the unselfish manager, more
is invested in the risky asset than when s  0.2; overall the problem becomes a close
approximation to one that is deterministic rather than stochastic.
Figure 10. Control rule for unselfish manager and final distributions when
s  0.05
Looking at the histograms one could potentially come to the conclusion that the selfish
manager does perform better than the unselfish manager in this case. Above $90 000, the
selfish manager easily outperforms the unselfish manager. The probability that the client
will receive a fund in excess of the target is much higher with a selfish manager. The me-
dian and VaRs of the selfish manager are also an improvement on the unselfish manager.
Analysis, later on in the paper, shows the only drawback to be that the probability of
obtaining over $75 000 is slightly lower. These deficiencies are quite minimal but suggest
that the cautious-relaxed utility measure may not be ideal when dealing with problems
with low volatility s hence almost deterministic. Graphs shown in Figure 14 demon-
strate changes in the customary distribution-parameters obtained for the two managers
for different volatilities.
We have aslo calculated the fund value at discrete time steps during the investment
period. From this an approximate value of each manager’s payoff throughout the period
can be calculated by summing the revenues at each time step. This will give an idea
of the improvement in the manager’s payoff from the new strategy. The average selfish
manager’s payoff for a sigma of 0.05 is $2 681 compared to $2 670 for an unselfish manager.
This shows that there has been an increase in revenue from the management fee, but a
minimal one.
A possible method for identifying the differences between two investment strategies is
plotting the paths or time profiles of both managers’ portfolios. The graphs show how
ten selfish and unselfish funds evolve over time, given the investment strategies shown in
24 JARRED FOSTER AND JACEK B. KRAWCZYK
Figure 11. Wealth tme profiles for selfish (blue) and unselfish (red) man-
ager when s  0.05
Figure 10. The results for both managers are simulated using the same random numbers,
meaning the behaviour of the risky asset is identical for both of their portfolios. The time
profiles of wealth when s is 0.05 are shown in Figure 11. To help illustrate the difference
between the two managers the simulations for both selfish and unselfish are shown on
the same plot. The selfish manager’s are shown in blue and the unselfish manager’s are
shown in red. Figure 11 shows the similarities between the wealth realisation profiles of
the two managers at this level of volatility, in that all but two of the runs show the same
fund evolution over time. Only in the case when the risky asset performs very well does
the selfish manager start to excel. An interesting point to note is there seems to be little
smoothing of the fund value by the selfish manager as one might expect. The manager’s
payoff is dependent on the fund value throughout the investment period, therefore it
would be expected that there would be some incentive to attempt to raise the fund value
during the investment period. But, for n  0.0001 and s  0.05, the cautious-relaxed
features of the investment policy appear to prevail and, as said, we observe little or no
fund raises for most of the wealth profiles.
Now, moving on to a more stochastic scenario, the strategies and distributions of the two
managers when s  0.4 are shown in Figure 12.
The selfish manager’s strategy is slightly more aggressive and as a result shows a better
probability of achieving the target. Whether the selfish manager’s distribution is superior
to that of the unselfish manager is again a matter of preferences. However, the probability
of achieving a fund that is within 5% of the target has improved slightly. The probabilities
of loss are only slightly higher (less than 1%) for the selfish manager, for approximately
a 2% increase in the probability of achieving over $75 000. Again, this could lead one to
conclude that an improved distribution might be the result of a manager acting selfishly
when the client has a cautious-relaxed utility measure. It is very difficult to make such
claims because it is highly dependent on the choices of the client, however the manager
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Figure 12. Control rule and final distributions for selfish and unselfish
manager when s  0.4
acting in their own interest has not caused a decline in the quality of the distribution. The
selfish manager’s payoff is now $3 104 compared to $3 091 for the unselfish manager. This
again shows a very small reward for the manager considering their own preferences, while
allocating the client’s portfolio. The corresponding time profiles are shown in Figure 13
and comparative statistics are plotted in Figure 14.
In this scenario the difference between the two strategies is a lot easier to see. The
increased volatility is much more obvious here in that when the risky asset is performing
strongly in the upper section of the plots, the selfish manager starts to perform better.
In the lower section of the plot it is the unselfish manager who is more cautious, with the
red lines lying above the blue. This gives a good illustration of the increased volatility
brought out by the fund manager thinking of their own payoffs.
The plots shown in Figure 14 provide a summary of the above findings, with other levels of
s added to provide extra insight. The graphs show that there are not strong relationships
between the measures and the two manager’s performances. It is rare that one manager
clearly outperforms the other in a measure for all levels of volatility. The selfish manager’s
mean and median is superior for all tested values of sigma 0.6 and below, above this level
the unselfish manager’s are better. The client’s utility measure (the mean value of spxpTqq)
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Figure 13. Wealth time profiles for selfish (blue) and unselfish (red) man-
ager when s  0.4
of the unselfish manager is always higher as expected. The probabilities of loss (ie, the
probability of making less than $40 000 or $62 732) seem to be consistently higher for
the selfish manager. An interesting characteristic of these plots is that the probability of
having a final fund value less than $40 000 starts to decrease for higher values of s. This
is at first an unexpected result as you would expect with a higher volatility would come a
higher probability of loss. However, looking at the investment strategies of both managers
with high values of s, we note that they are very cautious. For example the manager’s
both have approximately 20% invested in the risky asset at time 0 when s is 0.4. This
compared to around 60% for a sigma of 0.2. Finally, the probability of obtaining a fund
value over $75,000 appears better for an unselfish manager with a less volatile asset, but
this is reversed when s is at a higher level.
This analysis shows that a manager acting selfishly on their own behalf does not have
large ramifications in terms of the performance of the fund. In some cases, certainly
because of the impact of the neutral-risk part of the combined measure on the strategy,
the performance of the fund seems to improve. This is to be especially true when the risky
asset is less volatile in that there is an increased mean, without any significant decrease
in the other characteristics. In this case perhaps the unselfish manager would be well
advised to choose a higher target.
7. Conclusion
This paper performs a further analysis of issues brought up in Krawczyk (2008) involving
cautious-relaxed investment strategies obtained as optimal solutions to a stochastic opti-
mal control problem. It was shown there that an investor with the utility measure kinked
around a target, also used in this paper, can find favourable left-skewed payoff distribu-
tions, which result from the kinked function optimisation. We claim and document in this
paper that these distributions, and hence the underlying strategies, should be attractive
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Figure 14. Comparisons of managers’ statistics with various volatilities
to loss-avoiding portfolio optimisers like pension-fund savers. On the other hand, these
savers might find undesired, the classical Merton-model based strategies, which generate
right-skewed payoff distributions.
We have analysed the success of various investment strategies by simulating distributions
of fund values using Monte Carlo methods. This means that a bigger picture is provided
than when one simply looks at one or two performance indicators, such as the mean
and/or variance. The use of histograms and a range of statistical properties allows us to
gather a much wider view of the pros and cons of various investment strategies. While
this can provide some great insight and we strongly believe it is a step forward in the field,
a disadvantage is that it makes the strict ranking of utility measures very difficult. This
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is because there are no guidelines on the exact properties that the investor does and does
not desire.Rather the problem becomes one where numerous distribution characteristics
are weighed up against each other resulting in a subjective opinion being made. The
result of this being that our definition of the investor in this problem as one that is a
pension-fund maximiser, heavily influences the ranking of portfolios in this paper.
Increasing the target causes investors to be more aggressive at the beginning of the saving
period ie,, they commit more wealth to the risky asset when the target is large than when
it is small. This riskier investment strategy leads to improved means and medians at the
expense of higher variances and skewness coefficients. An argument can still be made
that these distributions are an improvement over that of a Merton investor. The effect of
setting a target below the secure amount is also assessed. Here, the resulting distributions
possess some favourable qualities in that no fund value below the initial outlay will be
obtained. However, this advantage is outweighed by too high a frequency of fund values
below the guaranteed amount.
Further, we take a slightly different tact by attempting to model the incentives of the
manager, and how this might affect the client’s payoffs. It is shown that a risk-neutral
manager who puts some weighting on their own payoff introduces slight improvements in
a few parametric measures of the distribution. We show that the manager improves the
mean and medians of fund distributions for most levels of volatility of the risky asset,
without significantly affecting the probability of loss.
In summary, this paper has shown that findings in Krawczyk (2008) are robust in that
variations in the size of the savings target provide distributions that can still be claimed
better for pension savers than those found by the Merton manager. We have also provided
evidence that this finding remains true, even when a manager is tempted to deviate
towards their own payoff. Further study could assess the robustness of these findings to
transaction costs as well as the incorporation of a jump diffusion element in the risky
asset.
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